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INTRODUCTION
Conscious perception is typically assessed with either objective or subjective measures (Seth et al.,
2008). Measures are considered objective if conscious perception is estimated from performance
in a discrimination task; inability to discriminate between stimuli is taken as evidence that
participants had no conscious perception (Hannula et al., 2005).Measures are considered subjective
if participants report their visual experience on each trial (Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Del Cul
et al., 2007). One type of subjective measures consists of metacognitive judgments; the relationship
between metacognition and perceptual awareness is a matter of debate (Fleming and Lau, 2014;
Jachs et al., 2015) and I will not discuss these measures further. Likewise, I will not discuss post-
decision wagering approaches as they are affected by the participants’ risk aversion (Schurger and
Sher, 2008). Proponents of subjective measures stress that objective measures (discrimination)
provide only task performance and are not suitable for capturing visual experience (Lau, 2008).
The major objection against subjective measures is contamination by response bias. Because
it has been argued that participants can perform discrimination in the absence of perceptual
awareness, many researchers currently favor subjective measures. In this paper, I show that
objective measures (discrimination) and subjective measures (detection) are similar and both
measure task performance. I further propose that task performance can be used as a valid measure
of conscious perception.
OBJECTIVE MEASURES
To estimate conscious perception with objective measures, participants are typically asked to
discriminate between stimuli. Perceptual consciousness is thus operationalized as the ability to
discriminate between visual stimuli (Eriksen, 1960). Because biased responding can influence
overall accuracy, a bias free signal detection measure, d’ or sensitivity, is usually calculated. If d’
is not significantly different from zero, it follows that there was no conscious perception of stimuli.
This is considered by many the most rigorous procedure, yet it has been criticized on several
grounds (Reingold and Merikle, 1988, 1990).
The major technical criticism is that to demonstrate the absence of conscious perception,
one needs to prove the null-hypothesis which is theoretically not possible (MacMillan, 1986).
In practice however, this can be achieved by setting sufficiently strict criteria for statistical
power, although admittedly this is somewhat arbitrary. Alternatively, one can apply a Bayesian
statistical evaluation and calculate evidence for zero conscious perception (Dienes, 2014). Several
additional complicating issues have been raised. For example, any measure should be exhaustive
for all relevant aspects of conscious experience as well as exclusive for conscious perception only
(Reingold and Merikle, 1988, 1990), although exhaustiveness and exclusiveness requirements are
not unique to objective measures.
Even if all technical issues can be adequately addressed, we face a major conceptual issue
that it seems cannot be solved easily. Critics of objective measures emphasize that with objective
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measures (discrimination) we only ever estimate task
performance (Lau, 2008) and that this estimate is not a
measure of conscious experience. In fact, one could, the
argument goes, estimate performance of any animal or even a
photodiode and that would not require any consideration of
consciousness at all. That is correct; objective measures only
estimate task performance. However, I will argue that subjective
measures (detection) fare no better; they only provide a different
estimate of task performance and are thus vulnerable to the
same criticism as objective measures. The main reason is that in
detection task one performs just another type of discrimination,
usually stimulus vs. background. This fact is not well appreciated
and many investigators believe that objective measures should
be abandoned in favor of subjective measures that estimate
conscious perception more directly (Merikle et al., 2001).
SUBJECTIVE MEASURES
The appeal of subjective measures lies in the fact that one
presumably obtains introspective reports, which unlike objective
measures, are more directly related to participants’ conscious
visual perception (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001; Merikle et al.,
2001). Three types of subjective measures have been proposed:
confidence ratings, post-decision wagering, and direct reports of
visibility. The exact nature of the relationship between confidence
ratings about perceptual decisions or metacognitive approaches
and perceptual consciousness is currently a matter of debate
(Zehetleitner and Rausch, 2013; Fleming and Lau, 2014; Jachs
et al., 2015; Rausch et al., 2015). Similarly, the relationship
between post-decision wagering (Persaud et al., 2007) and
perceptual consciousness is unclear and can be affected by the
participants’ risk aversion (Schurger and Sher, 2008; Fleming
and Dolan, 2010). Here, I discuss only subjective measures
in which participants directly report their visual experience.
Participants are typically asked to report their conscious visual
perception of the stimulus on every trial and trials are sorted
based on perception scale. Scales vary in gradation from binary
“seen,” “unseen” (Lau and Passingham, 2006; Ro, 2008) and
multiple discrete levels scales (Zeki and Ffytche, 1998; Overgaard
et al., 2006) to scales with continuous visibility (Sergent and
Dehaene, 2004). To obtain evidence for unconscious processing,
only trials on which participants report no conscious perception
of the stimulus are typically analyzed. This procedure is
more meaningful for consciousness studies, the argument goes,
because evidence for unconscious perception is obtained only
from trials on which participants state directly that they did not
see the stimulus.
Although this procedure has been criticized on several
fronts (Goldaimond, 1958; Eriksen, 1960), the major criticism
is the possibility of biased responding. Whether or not the
participant responds with “yes” on particular trial depends in
part on his or her willingness to say “yes.” Because subjective
reports seem much more appealing for measuring conscious
perception, the problem with biased responding is acknowledged
but downplayed (Merikle et al., 2001).
If this is the case should we use subjective measures? In the
following section I present a line of reasoning that shows the
illusory nature of subjective measures.
THE ILLUSORY NATURE OF SUBJECTIVE
MEASURES
Is there a value in using subjective measures because they better
capture subjective experience, which is what we are interested
in? Well, let us examine this issue a little closer by looking at
a participant responding in a detection task. Suppose that on
each trial we present either a dim red circle or no circle and
participant John is instructed to perform a detection task.We run
the experiment and separate trials into two sets. Are we justified
to say that we have separated trials based on John’s subjective
experience? What exactly happened during the experiment? We
need to take a step back and examine John’s ability to follow
instructions in this particular task. We, as experimenters, have
no direct access to John’s experience of red and he has no means
of having us experience the red he is experiencing. These facts
are generally accepted and acknowledged by the proponents of
subjective measures (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001). What we
do have however, is a set of correlations. As John acquired
his vocabulary, he learned that people say the word “red”
when looking at strawberries, blood, and lips; he established
an association between his experience of redness and arbitrary
motor output “red.” In the detection task, he is simply reporting
that correlation. Thus, we are only measuring his performance
and his reports have nothing that tells us directly about his actual
experience. By the same token, a parrot can learn a correlation
between its visual experience and some arbitrary motor output.
We should be able to obtain the same type of “subjective”
reports from animals. In other words, an organism can only
report correlations and we can only measure task performance.
Although consciousness researchers generally accept the private
nature of a first-person experience, subjective reports, such as “I
see a red circle”, are taken at face value.
Importantly, John has no direct knowledge of the outside
world. He is classifying his perceptual experiences regardless
of whether we call the measure objective or subjective. No
matter how the question is posed, language does not give John
any special powers to make his report more subjective. When
only trials on which John reported no conscious perception are
analyzed, we are essentially taking only misses and discarding
hits. This approach creates two problems. First, classifying a
trial as a miss depends on John’s ability to discriminate the
signal (a red circle) from the noise (monitor background) as well
as on his criterion placement. Because the distribution of hits
and misses depends on arbitrary criterion placement, such trials
should not be interpreted in isolation (Schmidt, 2015). Second,
an awareness measure is usually combined with an indirect
measure (e.g., priming) in studies of unconscious perception.
By selecting a subset of trials (misses) post-hoc, researchers may
obtain above chance performance on an indirect measure for a
purely statistical reason, the regression to the mean phenomenon
(Shanks, 2017).
In a typical discrimination task, both hits and misses are used
for calculating task performance. Although objective measures
are not immune to response bias, a bias free signal detection
measure of sensitivity (d’) provides one way of analyzing task
performance data. By treating a detection task as a discrimination
task, one can calculate d’ and obtain an objective measure of
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performance. Selecting only a subset of trials from a detection
task (misses) doesn’t suddenly make a measure subjective.
We have only different types of tasks and associated task
performances. The only question is how to properly analyze
data from such tasks. One could still argue that misses in a
detection task constitute a special, “No experience” category and
are therefore more suitable for consciousness studies.
IS THE “NO EXPERIENCE” CATEGORY
SPECIAL?
To appreciate that direct visibility reports are no more subjective
than objective measures, let us examine a detection task a bit
closer. Because in a detection task, unlike in a discrimination
task, one category is “No experience,” it seems natural to conclude
that such subjective reports are closer to what the participant
is experiencing, because this category presumably contains no
phenomenology. But such a conclusion is unwarranted. One
can run the same task but instead ask participants to rate the
visibility on a popular perceptual awareness scale (PAS), which
increases the number of response options from two to four.
Using PAS, subjects report their visual experience using four
ratings: (1) No experience, (2) Brief glimpse, (3) Almost clear
experience, (4) Absolutely clear experience. Now the participants
have a chance to report their experience on a finer scale. Suddenly
what was in the previous task categorized as “No experience”
is now distributed among additional categories, such as “Brief
glimpse.” In fact, each conscious experience is unique and the
participant is making fine discriminations and categorizing them
into discrete classes based on the response options provided.
The detection task is a discrimination task because our visual
experiences (qualia) are perceptual discriminations. Otherwise
we would have to conclude that using subjective visibility
reports on PAS includes subjective and objective measures;
comparing trials with ratings 1 and 2 would constitute a
subjective measure, since it contains category “No experience”
and comparing trials with ratings 2 and 3, an objective measure,
since a “No experience” category is not included. Importantly,
the “No experience” category does not represent a lack of
phenomenology. A participant engaged in a perceptual detection
task is experiencing monitor background when reporting “No
experience” of the target stimulus. Instead of treating the “No
experience” category as a special case, one could even argue that
the categories “No experience” and “Brief glimpse” are closer in
perceptual space than the categories “Brief glimpse” and “Almost
clear experience.”
If we are left only with task performance, can we even study
consciousness? After all, one can, for example, measure d’ for a
metal detector. But I think we can. The reason is that measuring
d’ at the personal level, in an experiment with manual or
verbal non-speeded responding, taps into different information
processing than measuring d’ for an isolated subsystem. If
we accept that visual experiences are visual discriminations at
the personal or more generally, at the organismal level, then
discrimination performance is a valid measure of perceptual
consciousness. By analogy, living systems display a set of
characteristics that together constitute “life.” There is no magic,
no vital force, just chemicals organized and interacting in a
specific, self-organizing manner, that give rise to the emergent
property we call “life.” One could argue that measuring growth of
an organism or parameters of its reproduction is not meaningful,
because one can measure growth of a crystal in solution or
parameters of its “reproduction,” but that is clearly not the case.
At the level of an organism measuring specific processes carries a
different meaning.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
CONSCIOUSNESS RESEARCH
The debate whether objective or subjective measures provide
a better estimate of conscious perception has revolved largely
around the issues of response bias and inadequacy of relying
on task performance alone. I suggest that subjective measures
do not assess the subjective character of our visual experience
any better than objective measures. It follows that the
“subjective” character of subjective measures is illusory and
that subjective measures, like objective measures, estimate only
performance on a discrimination task. The issue of response
bias, associated with any discrimination task, needs to be
addressed with a proper data analysis technique and signal
detection theory provides a bias free measure of performance.
An awareness measure is typically combined with an indirect
measure of stimulus processing (e.g., priming); this is a simple
dissociation paradigm, which requires demonstration of stimulus
processing in the absence of conscious perception. Which type
of discrimination task is the most appropriate to measure
conscious perception will vary with the particular experimental
question. In some studies, awareness of stimulus location or
color might be of interest; in others, investigators might assess
whether participants can detect the stimulus. Or, in a different
experiment, one could compare two types of discrimination
performances and ask for example, whether feature awareness
automatically results in location awareness. More generally, in
some experiments, d’ might be the most appropriate measure;
in others, visibility ratings might be particularly useful. Different
behavioral tasks used for measuring perceptual consciousness,
including detection, are all different versions of perceptual
discrimination, because our visual experiences are perceptual
discriminations.
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